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Abstract 
Many EU countries have been carrying out substantial pension reforms since the 
mid-1990s. This article studies whether the reforms that were carried out in ten EU 
countries before and after the financial crisis of 2008 are different. This is done 
through an analysis of the different elements of these reforms and also by comparing 
entitlements of statutory pension systems after each set of reforms. The main 
conclusion is that the pre-crisis reforms were much stronger and had a more negative 
impact on women than the post-crisis reforms. It is harder to determine whether this 
represents a temporary break in the reform process or a permanent change in the 
orientation of pension reforms in these ten countries. 
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 Introduction 1
Since the mid-1990s, governments across many EU countries embarked on very 
significant pension reforms. These reforms, though heavily contested and resisted, 
were legislated and implemented. In most cases, the focus was on reducing 
generosity, particularly by limiting the growth in the retirement period and changing 
benefit determination rules. Many reforms sought to change the incentives embedded 
in pension systems, particularly to ensure that there were clear financial advantages 
for individuals to contribute more. 
The financial crisis of 2008 impacted EU countries very differently. The weakening of 
government finances led even more governments to carry out pension reforms. 
Countries that had up to then not modified their pension systems were not in a 
position to continue to delay reforms. 
This article will however focus on those countries which enacted reforms before and 
after the crisis. The research question that will be posed is whether the financial crisis 
led to any major differences in pension reforms in these countries. To do this, we 
focus on ten EU countries that together make up 70% of the Union‘s population.1 
These countries have very different pension systems and carried quite varied 
reforms, which will be reviewed in the first part of this article. The second part will 
quantify the impact of these reforms on pension entitlements using OECD estimates 
of pension wealth.  
Both the literature review and the quantification exercise show that there are very 
clear differences in the pre- and post-crisis reforms. The pre-crisis reforms were quite 
significant and tended to impact women more than men, whereas the post-crisis 
reforms are much milder and appear more gender-balanced. This seems to suggest 
that post-crisis reforms constitute a ―second phase‖, where limited adjustments were 
made to the previous set of reforms, justified in view of the impact of the crisis. 
Policymakers, under this perspective, consider the pre-crisis reforms to have been 
relatively successful and want to retain them. However there are also some 
suggestions of a shift in the reform paradigm, especially for Eastern European 
countries. Whether this phase is a temporary break or whether it signifies a 
permanent change in the orientation of pension reforms in these ten countries is 
harder to ascertain at this stage.  
 
 
                                            
1 These countries are Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Sweden, Slovakia 
and the UK. 
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 An outline of pension reforms in the EU since the early 2
1990s 
Though the popular press tends to characterise pension reform in the EU as slow 
and marginal, the reforms which have taken place since the 1990s are substantial. 
This section will give an outline of these reforms, showing how the pensions 
landscape in Europe, particularly for younger generations, has changed dramatically. 
It will try to distinguish between those reforms carried out before and after the 
financial crisis. In this section, while the focus will be on the ten countries mentioned 
previously, we will at times adopt a more general view of EU-wide developments.  
At the start of the 1990s one pension model dominated Western Europe, with 
schemes run by the State, based on the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) funding principle and 
with an earnings-related defined benefit determination (DB) structure.  Throughout 
most of the second half of the twentieth century, reforms in Europe tended to move 
countries closer to this single pension model, with even Beveridgean countries,2 like 
the UK, introducing earnings-related features, and countries in Southern Europe 
moving away from traditional methods of family support during old-age and instead 
trying to adopt the state provision levels of their Northern neighbours. 
The 1990s, however, saw a departure from this trend in Western Europe and also the 
accession into the EU of Eastern European states who nearly all had transformed 
their pension systems away from PAYG DB. Hering (2006) notes that ―two-thirds of 
the 15 old EU countries reproduced their pension systems by enacting numerous 
marginal adjustment measures, focusing either on the refinancing or retrenchment of 
public pensions…but four countries—Sweden, Italy, Germany and Austria—
restructured their pension systems by cutting public pensions and replacing these 
increasingly with private ones, and thus began a gradual shift from the dominant pillar 
model to the multi-pillar one‖ (pp. 7). 
  
                                            
2
 See Bonoli (1997). A common categorisation of EU pension schemes is between Bismarkian 
systems, where pensions are related to employment and represent a deferred salary, and 
Beveridgean systems, where pensions are mainly seen as an age-related payment meant to alleviate 
poverty. 
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Table 1 Structural pension reform in Western Europe, 1995-2004 
Institutional 
development 
Dominant pillar systems Multi-pillar systems 
Reproduction by 
Adaptation 
Luxembourg 
Belgium 
Finland 
Spain 
Portugal 
France 
Greece 
Denmark 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Gradual 
Transformation 
Sweden 
Germany 
Italy 
Austria 
 
Source: Hering (2006) 
Bonoli & Palier (2007) visualise four stages of reform. Until the late 1980s, there was 
no retrenchment and the main action was to increase payroll taxes to finance any 
shortfalls. Concern over the level of contributions then led to some moderate 
retrenchment; usually changes in indexation. While resulting in only minor effects, the 
first reforms tended to be important as they brought pension reform, population 
ageing and the future of social security into the public debate. More radical reforms 
were pushed for in the early 1990s, though reforms were usually still negotiated on 
the basis of a quid pro quo: benefits were intended progressively to decrease in 
exchange for some concession, e.g. non-contributory pensions being financed from 
general tax revenues instead of through the insurance schemes. The first moves 
towards funded private provision were also made at this stage. Finally, the second 
wave of reforms (during the late 1990s) brought more innovation, such as the 
development of voluntary private pension funds and moves to increase employment 
rates among the elderly and to stop early retirement. As can be seen in Table 2, the 
more substantial reforms tended to have substantially long phasing-in periods. The 
authors argue that in this way the large cohort of baby boomers would only be 
marginally affected.  For instance, only about one in seven of the current electorate in 
Italy will be affected fully by the reforms made in the 1990s. 
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Table 2 Year of reform, full implementation and time lag for major pension reforms in 
France, Germany and Italy 
 Year of reform Full implementation Time lag in years 
France 1993 2004 11 
2003 2020 17 
Germany 1989 2012 23 
1999 2025 26 
2001 2030 29 
Italy 1992 2032 40 
1995 2035 40 
Source: Adapted from Bonoli & Palier (2007). 
While one might concede that reforms have tended to be gradual, heavily negotiated 
and with considerable time lags till full implementation, this should not be 
misconstrued as a claim that there was inertia in pension reform across Europe 
before the financial crisis. In its review of decades between 1990 and 2005, OECD 
(2007) finds that ten EU member states of the OECD made quite substantial reforms 
to their pension system. Grech (2013) notes that these countries are representative 
of the different pension system designs across the continent, include examples of the 
various type of reforms and also cover 70% of the EU‘s population. 
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Table 3 Reforms to statutory pension systems between 1990 and 2007, selected OECD 
countries 
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Continuation of Table 3 
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Table 3 summarises these changes, focusing on changes in the eligibility age, 
adjustments in retirement incentives, changes in qualifying conditions or benefit 
determination, the introduction of links to life expectancy or financial sustainability 
and moves toward defined contribution (DC), including notional account systems. 
Reforms can be divided into two broad sets: parametric and systemic.  The 
parametric reforms maintained unchanged the PAYG nature of pension systems but 
made substantial changes to their underlying rules – such as those on the accrual of 
pension entitlements, the age at which benefits are received, and required 
contribution periods.  Other countries have opted instead for systemic reforms i.e. 
moving away from the PAYG DB structure and adopting DC type schemes.3  Here 
one can discern two main types of reforms: World-Bank inspired multi-pillar reforms 
based on personal accounts (e.g. Slovakia and Hungary)4 and the adoption of 
notional defined contribution (NDC) systems (e.g. Sweden, Italy and Poland).5   
The distinction between parametric and systemic reforms has its shortcomings. For 
instance, while France, has not shifted totally to NDC (and thus it is categorised as a 
country with parametric reforms), it has introduced features that mimic the rules of an 
NDC model. France has introduced a link between the number of contribution years 
and life expectancy (Carone, 2005). In the same vein, Austria has also significantly 
modified its public pension plans and could be said to now have a personal notional 
defined benefit account system (Knell, 2005).  
Zaidi & Grech (2007) notes that the main difference between parametric and 
systemic reform lies not in the financial impact on pensioners (or contributors) but in 
the sharing of risk between the current generation and future ones or the State (the 
custodian of future generations in this respect). Parametric reforms, in fact, do not 
change public pension systems from a DB to a DC set-up. This has several important 
implications, such as the fact that longevity risk is still borne by the pension provider 
rather than the pensioner. Moreover redistribution is still possible under a DB system, 
something that is not achievable under DC, unless one puts in place subsidies for 
non-contributory periods (such as care and unemployment) and/or minimum income 
guarantees. However, there is evidence that in many cases this was not prioritised. 
Thus, Fultz and Steinhilber (2003) report that in Hungary contributors to personal 
accounts contribute 6% of their child care benefit to the pension system (instead of 
having credits as under the old system) and their future pension benefits were be 
calculated as a simple return on this contribution. 
Whereas the multi-pillar personal account systems are based on individual 
contributions being invested in financial markets, in an NDC system contributions are 
                                            
3
 A pension scheme where the pension benefits are related to the member's pensionable earnings 
(either at retirement or during earlier working life) and number of contributory or credited years is 
known as a DB scheme; and a pension scheme in which the pension benefits are linked to the fund 
value – this being dependent upon the contributions made into the fund, retirement age and also 
investment returns – is known as a DC scheme. 
4
 For a review see Independent Evaluation Group (2006). 
5
 See Palmer (2006) for a review of NDC systems. 
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retained by the State and the financing structure remains essentially PAYG. However 
pension benefits are determined according to the DC formula, i.e. they are 
determined by the accumulated contributions at retirement.6 The rate of return faced 
under an NDC is centrally determined and reflects the formula chosen (normally 
growth in the wage bill), whereas under personal accounts returns depend on the 
investment choices and the performance and stability of financial markets. This has 
significant implications in that all people face the same risks on return under the NDC 
scheme, and thus there is no income inequality resulting from individual choices. The 
notional return in NDC schemes can, however, differ substantially from the return 
under PAYG DB, as the NDC schemes, in fact, attempt to make the PAYG schemes 
automatically stabilising so that the ‗assets‘ and ‗liabilities‘ of the system balance out.  
For instance, in Sweden through the operation of an automatic balance mechanism, 
if there is a gap between projected revenues and forecast pension outlays the 
notional account interest and the indexing of annuities is reduced (see Capretta, 
2006 and Franco & Sartor, 2006). 
The financial crisis impacted negatively the image of private pensions being a stable 
source of long term income (see Yermo & Severinson, 2010 and Impavido & Tower, 
2009). It also made the adoption of mandatory individual pensions much less 
sustainable (see Whitehouse, 2009). As a result, Hungary closed down its mandatory 
private system while Slovakia and Poland limited it greatly (see Hirose, 2011 and 
World Bank, 2013). Drahokoupil & Domonkos (2012) also point out that the crisis 
marked a change in the consensus on the benefits of pension privatisation. 
On the other hand, reforms continued to push towards adopting stronger activation 
policies in welfare policies (Vis et al, 2011) with a strengthening of the contributory 
principle (see European Commission, 2012). It is somewhat strange that this 
happened at a time when jobs were very scarce and when there was an increasing 
use of atypical jobs, which typically are not covered well by the contribution system. 
Another element of continuation was a continued drive towards raising retirement 
ages, including a stronger push for automatic indexation to longevity, though one can 
also note several increases in minimum pensions or differential treatment of 
indexation for lower pensions (see Natali, 2011). On the other hand in some 
countries, such as Germany, changes implied by indexation and valorisation rules 
were delayed or modified7 (see Hinrichs, 2013), while in stressed countries 
policymakers were put in a situation where they had to carry out previously delayed 
pension reforms in order to sustain their fiscal credibility in the short term (Bodor & 
Rutkowski, 2013). This paper will focus on just one example of stressed economy, 
namely Italy, mainly reforms in the other stressed economies, such as Greece, were 
imposed from the outside rather than being devised by domestic policymakers (see 
                                            
6
 For an extensive explanation of how an NDC system operates, see Palmer (2006). 
7
 The ―Rentengarantie‖ approved in Germany in mid-2009 prevents pensions from decreasing as 
wages go down. For more details see Börsch-Supan, Gasche & Wilke (2010). Similarly in Sweden the 
adjustment formula underpinning the NDC system was modified to spread out the required adjustment 
(see Sunden, 2009). 
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Matsaganis, 2012 for an extensive discussion of the Greek experience). That said, 
while the reforms in Italy may seem a bit less drastic than those in Portugal or 
Greece, there is evidence (see Sanchez, 2014) that through the introduction of 
adjustment factors meant to keep systems in financial balance, in future there will be 
considerable impacts on retirees‘ standard of living. 
Table 4 summarises the reforms that have occurred after the financial crisis till the 
end of 2013. While at first glance, it may seem a shorter list of changes; in many 
cases the reforms are not marginal. Some appear to be knee-jerk reactions to the 
crisis – such as the limiting of indexation to just low pensions. In particular, reforms 
that were meant to address long-term challenges were tinkered with, in part as 
politicians argued that these short-term changes reflected current developments and 
would not have long term effects. However if they are maintained over time, they 
could turn into a clear breaks with the past philosophy of the pension system, 
especially in Bismarkian systems such as Austria and Italy. Natali & Stamati (2014) 
argue that the reforms were mostly conceived as cost containment measures, and in 
this sense they could put future adequacy at risk. In particular they point out that 
these reforms further accentuate the possibility of more inequality arising from risk 
individualisation and increased vulnerability to external shocks. 
That said, there have been attempts to restrict the impact of changes on those on low 
incomes, and in some countries the post-crisis reforms resulted in the setting up of 
better – or more clearly defined - minimum pensions. On the other hand, pension 
ages have continued to rise while the link between benefits and labour market 
participation has been strengthened. It is thus unclear a priori whether the reforms 
carried out after the crisis in the ten European countries that had conducted 
significant reforms prior to the crisis were stronger or weaker than previous reforms. 
This will be the scope of the quantitative assessment made in the second section of 
this article. 
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Table 4 Reforms to statutory pension systems between 2008 and 2013, selected OECD 
countries 
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Continuation of Table 4 
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 12 
 Quantifying the impact of pension reforms in the EU 3
since the early 1990s 
The previous section showed that while there were important elements of continuity 
in the pension reform process in EU countries before and after the financial crisis, 
there were also significant differences. Keeping the focus on the ten countries where 
reforms have been going on since the early 1990s, this section will try to quantify the 
impact of these pension reforms with a particular focus on distributional effects. This 
will be done by comparing estimates of pension wealth computed by the OECD (see 
OECD, 2007 and OECD, 2014) for the mid-1990s, 2007 and 2013.8  
Pension wealth is the total value of projected statutory pension payments to an 
individual throughout retirement (defined in terms of a multiple of the contemporary 
average wage). Amongst the key benefits of using this measure, rather than other 
measures of pension entitlements, there is the fact that this measure is affected by 
reforms which raise retirement age and those which change the way annual benefits 
change after retirement. These two particular reforms, as was shown in the previous 
section, were amongst the most frequently legislated changes in recent decades. 
Table 5 shows the OECD estimates for men and women on different parts of the 
wage distribution, starting for someone on half the average wage up to someone on 
double the average wage. Typically those on half the average wage would be on the 
minimum pension, while those on double the average wage would be earning the 
maximum pension. Pension wealth estimates are shown as multiples of the 
contemporary average wage in that country, to help cross-country comparisons. They 
represent the total sum of annual benefits that the individual can expect if s/he has 
an average life expectancy, discounted so that future benefits are less valuable than 
current ones.9 Thus for instance, in the mid-1990s the average French man could 
look forward to total pension transfers during his whole retirement equivalent in 
money terms to ten times the average wage in France. By 2007, this had fallen to 
eight times the average wage, and improved slightly by 2013. 
The picture that emerges looking at Table 5 is that with very few exceptions, namely 
those on higher incomes in the UK, Poland and Slovakia, pension wealth declined 
substantially in the pre-financial crisis reforms. On average, the decline was close to 
17% for men and 21% for women. However there was considerable heterogeneity 
across countries. The worst losers were lower-income women in Slovakia who lost 
the equivalent of six years of average wages. Similarly Polish lower-income women 
lost transfers worth four years of the mean wage. 
                                            
8
 The OECD computes these estimates using its APEX (Analysis of Pension Entitlements across 
countries) model, which codes detailed eligibility and benefit rules for mandatory pension schemes 
based on available public information that has been verified by country contacts. It is used in the 
OECD‘s biennial ‗Pensions at a Glance‘ publication, in the World Bank‘s ‗Pensions Panorama‘ and in 
European Commission reports. 
9 For more details on interpreting pension wealth indicators, see Grech (2013) or OECD (2014). 
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Table 5 Pension wealth for men across the wage distribution using mid-1990s, 2007 
and 2013 pension rules (multiples of average wage) 
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Table 6 Pension wealth for women across the wage distribution using mid-1990s, 
2007 and 2013 pension rules (multiples of average wage) 
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The pre-financial crisis pension reforms tended to affect women more than men. This 
was principally due to the fact that a key reform tended to be gender pension age 
equilisation which only reduced pension entitlements for women. Another reform that 
affected women disproportionately was the move towards weaker post-retirement 
benefit indexation. As women have longer lives than men, this change meant that 
their pension entitlements were reduced proportionately more than those of men. The 
move to link benefits more directly to contributions also impacted more on women, 
especially in Eastern European countries where the pre-crisis reforms tended to do 
away with progressive benefit formulae. 
However it should be noted that with the exception of Poland and Slovakia, the pre-
crisis reforms targeted those on high incomes more than those on low incomes. For 
instance whereas a man earning half the mean wage in Austria lost nearly 8% of his 
entitlements due to reforms, a man on double the mean wage lost nearly 19%. 
Similarly in France, those on the lowest income lost quite little whereas those on high 
incomes lost nearly 18% of their pension wealth. A closer look at the figures shows 
that in countries which adopted notionally defined contribution schemes, such as Italy 
and Sweden, the biggest losses were for those on the average wage, while 
reductions for those on the highest incomes were tapered. 
The financial crisis appears to have changed significantly the pre-crisis trend. On 
average, across the ten countries under study the net impact of the reforms was of 
just a slight deceleration in pension wealth. In fact, the decline for those on the 
average wage was 2% for men and 1% for women. Whereas Austria, Hungary and 
Poland continued to cut entitlements, the other countries either maintained pension 
wealth stable or even increased it. Another key difference was that whereas the pre-
crisis reforms had impacted more heavily on women, the more recent reforms have 
tended to more punishing on women. This could reflect the greater importance given 
to improving minimum pensions and putting in place crediting arrangement for those 
with career breaks. For instance, in Finland those on half mean wages saw an 
improvement of 4% in their pension wealth, whilst those on double mean wages did 
not register any gains. 
That said, there are also some signs of policy continuity. Countries like Italy and 
Sweden, where reforms tended to favour those on high incomes rather than those on 
average wages continued to do so in the post-crisis reforms. Countries like France 
and Germany, which had reforms that were more progressive in nature seem to have 
continued down that path. 
Looking beyond the ten countries under study, OECD (2014) indicates that in 
economies heavily affected by the financial crisis, such as Greece and Portugal, 
pension wealth declined considerably. In Greece the average person lost about 40% 
of their pension wealth, whereas in Portugal the loss was of 25%. This very strong 
reform process needs to be compared to the limited reforms that had been enacted in 
the so-called stressed economies before the financial crisis. Thus while among the 
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ten countries under study there was a slowdown in the pace of pension reform after 
the crisis, the economic downturn coincided with significant pension reforms in other 
EU countries. Incidentally the pressure on structural reforms made by creditor nations 
could reflect the fact that these same countries had gone through similar reforms in 
the previous decades. The end result would be that pension entitlements across 
Europe will have converged significantly as a result. 
 Conclusion 4
This paper has focused attention on ten EU countries which have legislated 
significant pension reforms both before and after the financial crisis. Both the 
literature review and the quantification exercise suggest that there were key 
differences between the two stages of reform, with the changes effected after the 
crisis being milder and attempting to make systems better suited to the needs of 
those more reliant on them. In particular, the strong gender differences of the pre-
crisis set of reforms appear to be much less prominent in the post-crisis reforms, with 
the exception of Eastern European countries which seem to have consolidated some 
of their pre-crisis reforms. 
It is harder to say at this stage whether the post-crisis reforms will be just a brief 
interruption in the long process of pension cuts observed since the mid-1990s or 
whether they mark a structural break and a clear change in reform orientation. It 
could be argued that if economic growth continues to falter, there will be pressures 
on governments to return to the previous reform paradigm of retrenchment. For 
instance, in Portugal even though before the crisis the sustainability of the pension 
system had been buttressed with the introduction of a number of automatic 
stabilisers, there still were significant cutbacks after the crisis weakened government 
finances. On the other hand, one could argue that the pre-crisis reductions in 
generosity were such that governments now need to focus more on pension 
adequacy. At all events, it seems likely that decisions on pension policy will continue 
to play a very important role in the socio-economic debate in the EU. 
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